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Abstract—This paper proposes strategies to improve the IOTA
tangle in terms of resilience to splitting attacks. Our contribution
is two fold. First, we define the notion of confidence fairness
for tips selection algorithms to guarantee the first approval
for all honest tips. Then, we analyze IOTA-tangle from the
point of view of confidence fairness and identify its drawbacks.
Second, we propose a new selection mechanism, G-IOTA, that
targets to protect tips left behind. G-IOTA therefore has a good
confidence fairness. G-IOTA lets honest transactions increase
their confidence efficiently. Furthermore, G-IOTA includes an
incentive mechanism for users who respect the algorithm and
punishes conflicting transactions. Additionally, G-IOTA provides
a mutual supervision mechanism that reduces the benefits of
speculative and lazy behaviours.
Index Terms—IOTA - Tangle, Transaction confidence, Tips
selection algorithm, Confidence fairness
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies have emerged
as one of the most revolutionary developments in recent years,
with the goal of eliminating centralised intermediaries and
installing distributed trusted services. They facilitate trustworthy
trades and exchanges over the Internet, power cryptocurrencies,
ensure transparency for documents, and much more. Tradi-
tionally, blockchain systems maintain a continuously-growing
list of ordered blocks that include one or more transactions
that have been verified by the members of the system, called
miners. Blocks are linked using cryptography and the order of
blocks in the blockchain is the result of a form of agreement
among the system participants.
After the releasing of the most popular blockchains (e.g.,
Bitcoin [5] or Ethereum [11]) with a specific focus on
economical transactions their huge potential for various other
applications became evident. However, quickly after their
release blockchains reached their limits in terms of throughput,
blocksize and unforeseen behaviors. Therefore, non academic
research further concentrate in proposing alternatives by
improving some performance aspects but with non zero costs
either on security or throughput. One of these solutions extends
the blockchain to a DAG overlay, provide a total ordering over
all blocks and transactions, and outputs a consistent set of
accepted transactions. In the research along this line (e.g., [8],
[9]) transactions are still organized on blocks. All these DAG-
based systems structure blocks in a Directed Acyclic Graph.
Each block can include several references to predecessors.
More recently, IOTA has been defined as an alternative
dedicated to IoT area where micro-transactions are submitted
at a very high frequence. Transactions define a DAG overlay
a.k.a. tangle. Strategies to maintain an IOTA-tagle have been
proposed and analyzed in [6]. IOTA-tangle properties have been
formalized and analyzed in [2], [7] and [4]. More recently, [10]
and [1] analyze in detail the stability and the attack resilience
of IOTA-tangle. One of the first works addressing the fairness
of the selection mechanism in the IOTA tangle is [3].
In this paper we introduce a new notion of fairness:
confidence fairness for tips selection algorithms to guarantee
the first approval for all honest tips. We propose a new tangle,
G-IOTA, that aims at increasing the overall fairness in IOTA-
tangle by protecting tips who have been left behind, incentivizes
users to respect the algorithm and punishes the conflicting
transactions. G-IOTA provides also a mutual supervision
mechanism that reduces the benefits of speculative and lazy
behaviours. Moreover, G-IOTA tangle is as resistant as IOTA-
tangle to attacks, especially to splitting attacks.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II
introduces IOTA and identifies its drawbacks. Section III
proposes G-IOTA that is designed to overcome the drawbacks
of IOTA-tangle. Section IV discusses the strengths and the
weaknesses of G-IOTA. Finally, Section V concludes the paper
and discuss future research directions.
II. BACKGROUND ON IOTA
In this section, we introduce the fundamental concepts of
IOTA system (Sections II-A, II-B and II-C). Furthermore, we
discuss the drawbacks of its design (Section II-D).
A. IOTA Tangle
IOTA is a permissionless distributed ledger that stores all
the transactions going though the system, shared by all the
users in the IOTA network. It utilizes a data structure called
the tangle [6].
The users in IOTA work cooperatively to verify the transac-
tions in the tangle for making the IOTA-tangle safe and reliable.
Users are grouped in two distinct subsets: honest users that
follow the IOTA protocol exactly, and malicious users that
show arbitrarily behaviors.
The tangle is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) where
each vertex is a transaction submitted to the IOTA network
and the directed links represent a verification of transactions.
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Fig. 1. An example of IOTA tangle
Figure 1 shows an example IOTA tangle in which the white
squared transactions are called verified transactions and the
grey squared ones are called unverified transactions or tips1.
The root of the tangle (transaction 0 in Figure 1) is called
the genesis transaction. The depth dt of a transaction t in the
tangle is then defined as the length of the longest path from
the genesis to the transaction. The depth D of the tangle, is
then defined as max(dt) ∀ t, i.e. the maximum depth over
all the transactions in the tangle.
Users submit transactions to the IOTA network. The transac-
tions submitted by honest users are called honest transactions,
and the transactions submitted by malicious users are called
malicious transactions. A submitted transaction received by a
user is called incoming transaction. Since incoming transactions
are not verified yet, they are also called incoming tips.
In all cases, to submit a new transaction to the tangle, two
transactions from the tangle must be chosen for direct verifi-
cation. In general, the tips should be chosen for this purpose.
Indirect verification means, on the other hand, verifying all
the transactions in the verification path of a tip/transaction.
Formally, a verification path for a transaction t is a set of
transactions St, containing all the transactions from t to
the genesis transaction. In Figure 1, the verification path of
transaction 8 is from 8 to 2 and 3 and to 0. Furthermore, if a
tip t has not received its first verification yet and D− dt > dS
where dS is a configurable threshold, we say that the tip t is
left behind.
It should be noted that unlike in the traditional blockchain
systems, the verification of transactions is the responsibility of
all users that want to submit transactions to the IOTA network.
In other words, to submit transactions, each user must contribute
to the IOTA network by verifying the previously submitted
transactions. Note that if there are conflicting transactions
between two possible chosen tips, the sender needs to chose
only one of them and chose another candidate tip to verify.
After verifying two tips, the sender of the transaction will
broadcast its transaction and the chosen tips to all the other
users in the network. By receiving submitted transactions from
other users, the receivers update their local tangle by attaching
the new transaction to the corresponding tips.
B. Tip selection algorithm
The method for choosing two tips for verifying is called the
tip selection algorithm and is an important decision for users.
1The term tips will be used hereafter throughout the paper.
To resist to various types of attacks and to reduce the negative
impact of lazy nodes (see [6]), three kind of tip selection
algorithm are proposed in [6]: Uniform Random, Unweighted
Random Walk and Weighted Random Walk algorithms. From
the analysis proposed in [6] the most advanced tip selection
algorithm is weighted random walk algorithm.
The Weighted Random Walk is an application of Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms. The main idea is
that multi-random walks are launched in the middle of the
tangle. A random walk will go towards candidate tips following
opposite direction of the arrows in the DAG (e.g., the opposite
direction of the arrows in Figure 1). As a transaction in a
tangle could have several directly verifying transactions, the
cumulative weight of a transaction v in a tangle is the total
number of the transactions verifying v directly or indirectly.
The more cumulative weight a next transaction has, the higher
probability the random walker will go to it.
Weighted Random Walk has a configurable parameter α to
control the effectiveness of the cumulative weight. With a high
enough α, even if the cumulative weights of two transactions
has a small difference, the transaction with a bigger cumulative
weight will have a higher probability to be chosen by the
random walk. On the other hand, if α is small enough, even if
the cumulative weights of two transactions have a big difference,
they have almost the same probability to be chosen by the
random walk.
The steps of the Weighted Random Walk algorithm are as
follows:
1 Chose an interval in tangle, [W, 2W ], where W represent
the depth or the length of tangle.
2 Place N random walks particles on transactions in that
interval.
3 Let N particles perform discrete direct weighted random
walkers toward tips.
4 Chose the two tips reached first by the random walks.
Note that to avoid choosing lazy tips that verify old
transactions, IOTA may discard random walks who reach tips
”too fast”.
C. Confidence of transactions
Transactions in tangle need to get enough (not only in terms
of quantity) verifications to be finally considered as confirmed.
In Bitcoin-like blockchains, we say that a transaction t can be
confirmed with high probability, if there are at least 6 blocks
appended to the block that contain t.
The confidence of a transaction is a percentage between
0% and 100%. A transaction in the tangle can be considered
as confirmed, if it has has enough confidence. Note that
”enough” depends on the relation between the participants
to the transaction. For a transaction between friends, 80% of
confidence could be ”enough” instead of 100% for transaction
between two strangers.
The confidence of transaction is in relation to the tips
selection algorithm. The general idea is that if a transaction
has a high probability to be verified by new tips in the future,
then this transaction will have a high confidence. For a given
Fig. 2. Illustration of a splitting attack scenario.
instant, t, we launch the tips selections algorithm n times.
Each run selects a tip. Let i be one of the tips in the tangle
at instant t, and ni is the number of time i has been selected
after launching n times the tips selection algorithm. Given a
transaction s, let As contains all tips that verify s directly or
indirectly. The confidence of the transaction s, Cs is:
Cs =
∑
ni/N ∀i ∈ As (1)
D. Drawbacks of IOTA-tangle
In [6] it is recommended that the Weighted Random Walk
algorithm needs to chose a α relatively high in order to avoid
Splitting attack.
1) Splitting Attack: In a splitting attack, the attacker splits
the tangle into two branches so that s/he can launch double
spending in these two different branches. When the total
cumulative weight of one branch goes down compared to
the other branch, the attacker generates several meaningless
transactions to keep the balance between these two branches.
Figure 2 illustrates a splitting attack. The attacker first generates
two conflicting transactions attached to the same previous
transactions. Any honest user who wants to verify both of
them has to chose only one of them during the tips selection.
Two independent branches therefore are generated automatically
by the users of IOTA. As these two branches independently
belong to two different verification paths, a pair of double
spending transactions appended to one and another will both
be considered as correct transactions, if these two branches keep
growing evenly. As the probability of having the same total
cumulative weight for these two branches is very low, without
additional intervention, more and more honest transactions
will chose the branche with higher total cumulative weight
according to weighted random walk tip selection algorithm.
However, the attacker will keep the balance between these two
branches by submitting meaningless transactions to the branch
having the smaller total cumulative weight.
To avoid splitting attacks, a high α value is needed for
weighted random walk tips selection. So that it will be very
hard for an attacker to keep the balance between two branches.
However, the higher α is, more tips could be left behind
according to the Weighted Random Walk algorithm given in
Section II-B.
Fig. 3. An example of tangle with a relatively high α = 0.7. As can be seen,
many tips are left behind.
Figure 3 shows a tangle with a relative high α. Grey vertexes
are tips, we can consider the tips in the left side as tips that
are left behind, and the tips in the right side as tips that are
not left behind (for the moment).
Using the weighted random walk algorithm with relatively
high α, the tangle is resilient to splitting attacks but converges
to an important rate of left behind tips. This means that the
honest tips who have been left behind cannot get any chance to
be verified except for the tips that are re-submitted. A similar
conclusion is also presented in [3].
We define the level of confidence fairness at a time t, CFt,
for a tips selection algorithm in a given IOTA-tangle network
configuration. That is 1 minus the proportion of none left-
behind transactions to all transaction at time instant t.
Fig. 4. An example of tangle with relative low α = 0.1: very few tips are
left behind.
The weighted random walker tips selection with high α
therefore, according to our analysis, has a lower confidence
fairness, compared with low α case shown in Figure 4.
III. G-IOTA
According to the analysis given in the previous section, II-D,
recent tips selection weighted random walk used in IOTA-
tangle gives a low fairness when choosing a relative high α
to resist splitting attack. For this reason, we propose G-IOTA
that allows honest transactions in a tangle to increase their
confidences evenly and quickly to meet the requirement of
high confidence fairness. Implicitly, this way, no honest tips
and transactions will be left behind during the growth of the
tangle. Transactions with low confidence for a relatively long
time can be considered as fake transactions. Therefore, fake
transactions can be detected easily which easy to implement a
punishment mechanism in G-IOTA.
A. Transaction confidence and Tips selection algorithm
Our high confidence fairness tips selection algorithm aims
at increasing the confidence of all honest transactions. In the
following we will discuss the relation between Transaction
confidence and Tips selection algorithm.
From the analysis proposed in [6], we conclude four
important facts that could help understanding the relation
between confidence and tips selection.
Note 1. The confidence of the majority of the honest transac-
tions increases with the evolution of the tangle.
Note that each transaction approves two other transactions.
It is clear that with the increase of the depth of a tangle, a
given transaction has an increased probability to be verified
directly or indirectly by the recent tips.
Note 2. Transactions will hold their confidences once it reaches
100% with high probability.
That is, when the confidence of a transaction s goes to 100%,
all the tips in As selected by n runs of tips selection algorithm
verify s directly or indirectly. Then, when new tips come into
the tangle they will chose with high probability tips to verify
only among tips in As.
Note 3. The confidence of a transaction s is at least equal
to the maximum confidence of a transaction among all the
transaction verifying s directly or indirectly.
Cs >= max{...Cq...} ∀q → s (2)
where the symbols q → s means transaction q approves s
directly or indirectly.
That is, consider p verifies transaction s directly or indirectly.
If Cp = p%, that means that by launching a lot of tips selection
algorithm, p% tips verify p. As p verifies s, that means selected
tips also verify s. The confidence of s therefore is at least
equal to the maximum confidence of a transaction among all
the transactions verifying s.
Note 4. If a none-tip transaction s has been left behind,
transactions q ∀q → s will also be left behind. And there
must be at least one tip approving s having a low probability
to be chosen by the tips selection algorithm, which means these
tips will be left behind with high probability.
If one tip has been left behind, there could be some none-tip
transaction approved by it that has been left behind.
That is, according to Note 3, all transactions verifying the
left-behind transaction s could not have higher confidence than
s has, they will therefore be left behind in the future with
high probability. The reason that a non-tip transaction is left
behind is that this transaction cannot get new verifications from
incoming tips. That means that the current tips approving s
have very low probabilities to be selected by the tip selection
algorithm.
If a tip has been left behind, it could lead to some left-behind
transaction, but not for sure because non-tips transactions
approved by it could have other tips that could be chosen
by the tips selection algorithm.
To increase the confidence fairness and to reduce de number
of left-behind transactions, there are three intuitive ways,
according to our analysis above:
1) Increase the number of non left-behind tips that verify
the left-behind transactions directly or indirectly.
2) Increase the probabilities that tips verifying left-behind
transactions directly or indirectly can be chosen by the
tips selection algorithm.
3) Increase the confidence of q, Cq ∀q → the left-behind
transactions.
B. Confidence fairness aware tips selection algorithm
According to the analysis detailed in Section III-A, we
propose a new confidence fairness aware tip selection algorithm
G-IOTA. This new algorithm is based on the weighted random
walk tips selection. In addition, we integrate a Left-behind
Tips Protection mechanism that allows tips who have been left
behind regain the opportunity to be approved by incoming tips,
which further decreases the transactions left behind.
The G-IOTA tip selection algorithm is as follows:
1) Launch the weighted random walk tip selection algo-
rithm.
2) Chose the two tips selected by the tips selection algorithm.
Note them as tips1 and tips2.
3) Search in the tangle tips left behind.
4) Chose one left-behind tip whose verification path con-
tains the smallest average confidence (among all non-
confirmed transactions) as the candidate of tips3.
5) Approve tips3, if it is conflicting with verification paths
of tips1 and tips2, then postpone the candidate to the one
who has the second smallest average confidence, until we
find one candidate for tips3 that does not conflict with
tips1 and tips2. tips3 therefore is the chosen left-behind
tips.
6) Chose tips1, tips2 and tips3 as three selected tips, if
tips3 exists; chose only tips1 and tips2, otherwise.
Note that our new tips selection algorithm allows each new
transaction approve additionally a left-behind tip if there is
any. This mechanism allows left-behind tips to be approved by
new incoming transactions. The reason is simple: when a new
transaction p arrives and choses two first tips, tips1 and tips2,
following the tips selection algorithm, this new transaction will
have a relative high probability to be approved in the future
according to Note 1. If p adopts the left-behind tips protection
and approve one more left-behind transaction s then s will
also get the chance to be approved in the future, because the
confidence of s, Cs is at least equal to Cp, according to the
Note 3.
Figure 5 shows how the left-behind tips protection gives the
opportunity to the left-behind tips and transactions to increase
their confidence. At a given instant, a partial view of a tangle is
as follows. Ignore the new incoming tips, the two grey vertexes
are left-behind transaction and tips. The reason for that is that
Fig. 5. Tips selection with left-behind tips protection
the branches they belong have significantly smaller cumulative
weights compared to the other branches. The probability that
grey tips can be chosen by tips selection algorithm is therefore
significantly smaller than for the other tips in another branch.
Then a new transaction (will be a new tip) comes. Very likely,
according to weighted random walk tips selection algorithm, it
choses tips1 and tips2 among the tips in the lower branch in
the figure. As there is a left-behind tip present in the tangle,
the incoming tips need to approve it respecting the new tips
selection algorithm description. In this way, the incoming tips
verify a left-behind tip, so that this left-behind tips regain at
least the confidence of the incoming tips, and so does the
left-behind transaction. As the new tips verify tips1 and tips2
in the branch with a higher cumulative weight, these new tips
therefore can continuously increase their confidence according
to Note 1.
By using the G-IOTA tips selection, all honest tips will be
guaranteed to receive one first approve in a fixed difference
of depth, DS , the threshold in the definition of left-behind
tips. The G-IOTA tips selection therefore holds a very high
confidence fairness since the left-behind transactions regain
their confidence with the evaluation of tangle.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we discuss and analyze the strengths and the
weaknesses of G-IOTA.
A. Incentives and Punishments
We show that our new tip selection algorithm has a good
confidence fairness. However, why would a user do additional
verification to approve the third tips to protect left-behind tips?
A reasonable incentive is that user helping other transactions
to regain the opportunity being approved will also receive help
from others if the honest users are the majority.
Also, in the process of choosing only one tip to approve
from two conflicting verification paths during the choosing
of tip1 and tips2, we can chose the one whose verification
path contains more transaction carrying out the left-behind
tips protection mechanism as a additional reward. Because
verification paths with more transaction carrying out the left-
behind tips protection means more honest user choosing this
path to attach their transaction. Note that by helping left-
behind tips, the whole confidence in the tangle of honest
transactions will increase fast. The conflicting transactions,
on the other hand, will be left-behind fast, because honest
users will not verify them. We can therefore recognize and
locate these conflicting transactions if they always hold low
confidence for an unusual long time duration (T >> Sd). This
big different confidence between honest transactions and fake
transactions can be used further as punishment mechanism.
B. Mutual Supervision Mechanism
What if a speculative user always verify a third tip, a non-
left-behind tip, to pretend it works hard for helping the others?
Or what if a lazy user only chooses non-left-behind transactions
to verify and pretends his/her new transaction has become a
left-behind tips. This lazy user then waits for others to save
that transaction?
Here we propose a Mutual Supervision Mechanism that
allows the user in the G-IOTA system detect speculative or
lazy behaviour. The idea is that, when a user receives a new
submitted transaction sent to him, it can look into his/her local
tangle, if once the tips selected, tips1, tips2 or tips3 is not a
left-behind tips for a long time, meaning that this transaction
has at least one path with length L to one tip. The receiver
can block this transaction or announce the sender that, s/he is
cheating. By the supervision of all honest users in the G-IOTA
system, the speculative and lazy users cannot profit from their
behaviours.
Note that, L depends on the network latency. In a high-
latency network environment, different nodes could have a
different view between their local views and the real view of
world tangle. That leads an honest user think that a transaction
is still left-behind in the tangle, even it has already been
protected by others in the real work tangle, we therefore can
use a relatively high L to tolerant this case. However, in a
low-latency network environment, every user normally receives
new transactions and flash their local tangles very fast. We say
that the local view and the real view of tangle has a very small
difference. In this case, L could be relatively small because
honest users will not be affected by the network latency. More
possible impacts of the network latency to the G-IOTA network
is also an interesting future work.
C. Attack Analysis
The G-IOTA tip selection algorithm follows basically the
same idea as Weighted Random Walk except for the left-
behind tips protection mechanism. This new algorithm still
takes two recent tips as the two parents following the same way
of Weighted Random Walk. The new tip selection therefore
tolerates all the attacks mentioned in [6]. In addition, our
left-tips protection mechanism allows higher α than Weighted
Random Walk of the original IOTA protocol. Therefore, it has
better resistance to splitting attacks.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we proposed G-IOTA, a new tips selection
mechanisms that combines a confidence fairness aware tips
selection algorithm and a mutual supervision mechanism. The
new tips selection algorithm, chooses not only two tips as
the classical IOTA but one more tip, which is a left-behind
tip in the tangle. That allows increasing the fairness in terms
of transaction confidence for all honest transactions in tangle
and guarantees the first approval for all honest tips. Integrated
incentive and mutual supervision mechanisms guide users to
abide by the proposed algorithm. In addition, the new tips
selection algorithm tolerates all the attacks tolerated by IOTA-
tangle, including the splitting attack.
As future work we intend to extend the analysis proposed
in [7] in order to prove that G-IOTA tips selection is a Nash
Equilibria.
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